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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff-Petitioner,

Case No.:

v.
FRANK DAVID GENTRY,

Category No. 13

Defendant-Respondent.
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO PETITION FOR WRIT
OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Utah Court of Appeals decide a question of

State law in a way that is in conflict with the decision of the
Utah Supreme Court?
2.

Did the Utah Court of Appeals decide an important

question of State law which has not been, but should be settled by
the Utah Supreme Court?
OPINION BELOW
The Court of Appeals Opinion was issued on August 24,
1990, and appears in State v. Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah
Ct. App. Aug., 1990) (a copy of the Court's opinion is contained in
the Addendum).

JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT
This Court has jurisdiction to consider this Petition
under Utah Code Ann,, § 78-2-2(3) (a) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
For the purposes of this Brief

In Opposition To The

State's Petition For Writ of Certiorari to this Court, respondent
incorporates and refers to the Petitioner's Statement Of The Case,
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A recitation of the facts is not necessary for purposes
of this Brief in Opposition to the State's Petition.
The relevant facts are accurately summarized in the Court
of Appeals Opinion.

State v. Gentry, 141 Utah Adv. Rep. 26-27.
ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT DECIDE A
QUESTION OF STATE LAW THAT IS IN CONFLICT
WITH A DECISION OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT.
The State's petition for a writ of certiorari must be
summarily denied because the Utah Court of Appeals did not decide
a question of State law that is in conflict with the decision of
this Court as argued by the petitioner.
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, and State v.
Gibbons, 740 P. 2d 1309 (Utah 1987) clearly mandates the trial court
2

must conduct an on-the-record review with the defendant before
accepting the defendant's guilty plea. As the legislature and this
Court have determined,

it is essential

that the trial

courts

consistently and routinely examine the defendants before accepting
a

guilty

plea

to

a

criminal

offense

because

of

the

severe

consequences that are attached to pleading guilty to a criminal
offense.
Specifically, Rule 11(5)(d) states:
The court . . . may not accept the plea until
the court has found:
(d) the defendant understands the nature and
elements of the offense to which he is
entering the plea; . . .
The State's reliance on Jolivet v. Cook, 784 P. 2d 1148
(Utah 1989), cert, denied, 110 S. Ct. 751

(1990) and State v.

Miller, 718 P.2d 403, 405, (Utah 1986), for the proposition that
this

court

did

not

mean what

it said

in Gibbons, and

cases

thereafter1 is misplaced for three reasons:
First, Jolivet and Miller concluded that the failure of
the trial court to make a "finding on the record" is not critical
so long as the record as a whole affirmatively demonstrates that
]

This Court clearly stated "that when a new rule of criminal
procedure constitutes a clear break with the past, it will not be
applied retroactively." State v. Hickman, 729 P. 2d 670 (Utah 1989)
n. 1.
Accordingly, this Court did not apply its strict
construction rule to guilty pleas that pre-dated Gibbons. In the
instant case defendants plea post-dated Gibbons.
3

the defendant entered his plea with full knowledge and understanding of the consequences and rights that the defendant is
waiving.

(Emphasis added).

Not only did the trial court in this

case fail to make this "finding on the record,11 the trial court
failed to even pose the appropriate questions to the defendant to
invoke necessary responses to determine whether the defendant was
entering his plea voluntarily and whether he understood the facts
and elements of the crime charged and its consequences.
Second, in Jolivet the trial court (per Judge Brian's
evidentiary hearing) made specific findings that the defendant
understood

the elements of the crimes charged

elements related to the facts.

Jolivet at 1150.

and how those
Therefore, this

Court applied the "clearly erroneous" standard of review2.
Third, in Jolivet, the defendant failed to provide the
Supreme Court with a transcript, and therefore this Court assumed
the regularity of the proceedings below.

Jolivet at 1150.

Petitioner's observation that this Court failed to point
out that the plea entered in State v. Copeland, 765 P. 2d 1266 (Utah
1988) , pre-dated its decision in Gibbons (as it did in State v.

2

This court could not make such a finding because the record
was void of compliance with Rule 11. The trial court asked the
State to review the record and demonstrate compliance with Rule 11.
The State did not respond. In fact, the record is riddled with
confusion as to what the defendant was charged with, bound over on
from the Circuit Court and the penalties that attached.
4

Hickman), and therefore the record-as-a-whole test still exists,
misconstrues the Court's language in Copeland and Gibbons.

This

Court took it upon itself to suggest ways to the trial court to
ensure that the defendant understood the nature and the facts of
the crime charged against him as required by the United States
Supreme Court in McCarthy v. U.S. , 394 U.S. 459 (1969). This Court
simply suggests that the most effective way would be for the
defendant to state in his own words his understanding of the
offense and the actions which make him guilty of the offense.
Reading this Court's language in context, this Court said that it
is

the

preferable

way,

but

that

the

true

test

is

one of

voluntariness. This statement does not excuse or permit the trial
court to not undertake its responsibilities and duties pursuant to
Rule 11(5) and this Court's decision in Gibbons to examine the
defendant to ensure that the defendant understands the facts and
the nature of the elements charged against him.

See State v.

Copeland. 765 P.2d at 1273 (Utah 1988); State v. Gibbons at 1312.
Obviously on appeal, the appellate courts must look to
the record to determine whether, in fact, the trial court has
strictly complied with Rule 11(5) and Gibbons.

The Utah Court of

Appeals correctly read this Court's decision in State v. Smith, 777
P.2d

466

(Utah 1989).

This Court said that in order for a

defendant's guilty plea to be valid and in compliance with Rule
5

[11(6)5], Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Gibbons, the record
must show that the defendant was unequivocally and clearly informed
about the sentence that would be imposed.

As this Court has

pointed out, the procedure necessary to follow Rule [11(e)5] and
Gibbons may take additional time, but constitutional rights may not
be sacrificed in the name of judicial economy3.
This

Court's

reasoning

and

rationale

for

Gibbons at 1314.
requiring

strict

compliance with Rule 11(5) clearly demonstrates that the decision
of the Utah Court of Appeals, in State v. Gentry, was not in
conflict with the decision of this Court in Gibbons.

Accordingly,

the petitionees writ of certiorari should be denied.
POINT II
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT
DECIDE AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF STATE LAW
WHICH HAS NOT BEEN SETTLED BY THIS COURT.
Gibbons clearly instructs the trial court to conduct an
on-the-record examination with the defendant to ensure Rule 11(5)
3

Even though there are hundreds and even thousands of guilty
pleas entered in the various courts throughout the State of Utah,
most trial courts routinely and consistently follow Rule 11 and
State v. Gibbons, by examining the defendant to ensure that they
have complied with the rules and this Court's holding to determine
that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty
plea before said guilty plea is accepted by the trial Court. This
procedure not only guarantees that defendant's constitutional
rights will be upheld but also discourages or at least facilitates
swift disposition of post-conviction attacks on the validity of the
guilty plea because the trial judge will have produced a clear,
adequate record for review (See Gibbons at 1314).
6

is complied with, thus assuring the defendant's plea of guilty is
knowingly and voluntarily made. Each and every time this Court or
the Utah Court of Appeals mentions the words "looking to the
record" to determine whether the trial court has complied with Rule
11(5) does not mean that the "record as a whole test" is being
resurrected.

It simply indicates that the appellate courts must

look to the record to determine whether Rule 11(5) and Gibbons have
been complied with.
The defendant contends that the State should not be
allowed to engage in semantics as a basis for requesting this Court
to grant the State's petition for writ of certiorari asking this
Court to clarify its ruling when the Gibbons opinion is clearly
stated.
Not only does the legislature, but also this Court
correctly assert that before a guilty plea is accepted

in a

criminal case the trial court must strictly comply with Rule 11(5)
to ensure that the defendant's guilty plea

is knowingly and

voluntarily entered.
WHEREFORE, respondent submits that petitioner's writ of
certiorari should be denied and attorney
respondent.

7

fees be awarded to

CONCLUSION
Petitioner's logic that the "record as a whole test" is
the most reasonable approach to avoid post-conviction attacks on
the voluntariness of a guilty plea contradicts common sense.

The

penalties

and

attached

to

criminal

offenses

both

monetarily

involving one's liberty are severe. Before one subjects himself to
the jurisdiction of the Court for sentencing, the trial court must
strictly comply with Rule 11(5) and Gibbons to ensure that the
defendant's constitutional rights are protected and to ensure that
defendant is knowingly and voluntarily entering his guilty plea.
Post-conviction attacks on the voluntariness of the guilty plea
will be precluded or swiftly dealt with if the trial court simply
takes the additional time to adequately examine the defendant
before he enters his plea. To accept the position asserted by the
petitioner leaves open the question whether there is enough information on the record-as-a-whole to demonstrate that the defendant
knowingly and voluntarily entered his guilty plea even though the
trial court failed to directly examine the defendant as to the
facts and nature of the elements charged against the defendant.
The record-as-a-whole test leaves open the question as to whether
the defendant fully understood the nature of what he was doing and
therefore should not be upheld.

8

WHEREFORE, the respondent asserts the State's petition
for certiorari should be denied.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^ ^

day of October, 1990.

)L> jyya. I , (A)dm,

GEORGE T/WAbDOUPS
Attorney for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
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of the foregoing BRIEF IN OPPOSITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS were mailed, postage paid, to:
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Attorney General
DAVID B. THOMPSON
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Assistant Attorneys General
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DATED the £<¥•
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been excluded, if thf defense was not to be
permitted to call Alvin Barker in rebutial.
Having concluded that the court erred in
failing to exclude Deputy Troester's restatement of Alvin Barker's opinion of Deputy
Naylor's performance, we must now consider
whether this error was harmless or prejudicial.
An error is harmless, and not grounds for
reversing a conviction, if, absent the error,
there is no substantial likelihood of a better
result for the defendant. Utah R. Crim. P.
30(a); Srare v. Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1140
(Utah 1989); Srare v. Verde, 770 P.2d at 116,
120-122 (Utah 1989).
In this case, one of the main points of the
defense was that Deputy Naylor's use of force
was excessive and overly aggressive. There
were substantial factual discrepancies between
the eyewitnesses' accounts of what happened,
and Deputy Naylor's account (from which we
have drawn the above statement of the facts)
tends more to justify his role in this altercation than do the accounts of the Barker
parents and of Gary Barker. In resolving this
factual conflict, the testimony of Alvin Barker
may well have been important. Alvin Barker
intervened in the fight to aid Deputy Naylor in
ending the struggle, but at trial, he saw no
need for the deputy's resort to violence and
portrayed Gary Barker's actions as mainly
evasive and self-protective. Thus, the jury
could well have found that Alvin Barker's
testimony was critical in determining what
happened, assessing the extent and nature of
Gary Barker's resistance, and in evaluating his
claim of self-defense.
Given the conflicting evidence, and also in
view of the rather lengthy jury deliberations,
this appears to have been a close case factually. We therefore conclude that, if Alvin
Barker's hearsay statement had been excluded
or if Alvin Barker had been permitted to
testify concerning it, there is a significant
possibility of a result more favorable to the
defendant Gary Barker.
We therefore reverse and remand.
Robert L. Newey, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Russell W. Bench, Judge
Norman H. Jackson, Judge
1. Robert L. Newey, Senior Juvenile Court Judge,
sitting by special appointment pursuant to Utah
Code^Ann. §78-3-24(10) (Supp. 1990).
2. Deputy Naylor was the only witness called by the
State who was present when the crime was committed. Since the jury found for the State, we view the
facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the
convictions, State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 285
(Utah 1989). We have therefore relied extensively on
Deputy Naylor's testimony and resolved conflicts
and doubts in the evidence according to his view of
the facts.
3. SeeUtahR.Evid. 801(c).

R^p

Provo, Utah

?4

4. See United States v. Brennan, 798 F.2d 581, 58789 (2d Cir. 1986) cert, denied, _.U.S.
109 3. Ct.
1003 (1989); United States v. Williams, 751 F.2d
594, 606-1'J (7th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 470 U.S.
1003 (19S5).
5. United States v. West, 670 F.2d 675, 686-87 (7th
Cir. 1982) cerf. denied 457 U.S. 1124 (1982); United
States v. Fiore, 443 F.2d 112 (2d Cir. 1971); see
United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 108 S.Ct.
838, 844 (1988) (cross-examination requirement of
Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1) and right of confroniation
are satisfied where declarant takes the stand and
responds to questions concerning the out-of-court
statement despite claimed lack of recall); 4 D.
Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence §419 at
179-81 (1985).

Cite as
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IN THE
U T A H COURT OF A P P E A L S
STATE of Utah,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Frank David GENTRY,
Defendant and Appellant.
No. 890145-CA
FILED: August 24, 1990
Fifth District, Iron County
Honorable J. Philip Eves
ATTORNEYS:
George T. Waddoups, Salt Lake City, for
Appellant
R. Paul Van Dam and Sandra L. Sjogren, Salt
Lake City, for Appellee
Before Judges Billings, Garff, and
Greenwood.
OPINION
GREENWOOD, Judge:
Appellant Frank D. Gentry appeals the trial
court's denial of his motion to withdraw his
guilty plea. We reverse and remand.
Gentry was one of six children born to
Milton and Ivy Jane Gentry. Milton owned a
1,840 acre ranch located near the Beaver/
Iron County line in southern Utah. In 1949,
Gentry built a cinder block cabin on the
ranch. Since that time, Gentry worked the
ranch on a daily basis and lived in the cabin
nearly full time. Milton died in 1962 and, by
holographic will, left the ranch to Ivy Jane
and their six children. After his father died,
Gentry continued to work the ranch. In 1966,
Gentry's siblings and Ivy Jane executed a
power of attorney authorizing Gentry to
manage the ranch. When lvv died intestate in

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS
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1977, Gentry and his siblings each inherited an
equal share of the ranch.
Soon after Gentry began managing the
ranch, antagonism developed between Gentry
and his siblings. Their relationship eroded and
the family began to question Gentry's authority to manage the ranch. The ranch also
became the subject of a series of lawsuits and
court-ordered sales. In 1981, as a result of a
lawsuit to partition the ranch, the district
court ordered a sale of the ranch. Gentry's
interest in the ranch was purchased for approximately S22,000. Gentry objected to the
validity of the sale, claiming that the payment
was intended solely to reimburse him for
improvements and work he had performed on
the ranch. Several months passed before he
negotiated the check representing his sale
proceeds. He allegedly later used the money
for improvements and upkeep on the ranch.
After the 1981 partition sale, Gentry continued to use the ranch. In 1983, Gentry retained an attorney and attempted to purchase a
portion of the ranch from two of the owners,
but did not consummate any purchase. On
November 10, 1986, Gentry's brothers, Mack
and Joseph Gentry, each sold their interest in
the ranch to Dan and Paul Roberts, sons of
Gentry's sister, Mary Lou.
In 1986 and 1987, without permission from
the ranch owners, Gentry and his son, Curtis,
received payments from Carlyle Stirling for
grazing on the ranch property. They did not
transmit any of the monies collected from
Stirling to the ranch owners.
Dan and Paul Roberts brought charges of
theft by deception and criminal trespass
against Gentry and his son Curtis. Gentry and
his son countered with a civil suit for quiet
title and adverse possession against all the
ranch co-tenants.
On September 20, 1988, Gentry appeared at
an arraignment before Judge J. Philip Eves.
Gentry reviewed and signed an affidavit,
which set forth the charge of theft, but not the
alleged facts. Gentry pled not guilty.
Trial was held before Judge Eves on
January 25, 1989. After the close of evidence,
but prior to closing arguments, Gentry
changed his plea from not guilty to guilty of
theft, a third degree felony. The State dismissed the criminal trespass charge. Imposition
of sentence was stayed pending Gentry's successful completion of eighteen months probation. Conditions of probation included
Gentry agreeing to 1) not enter the ranch
property without prior written consent of Paul
or Dan Roberts, 2) not harass or offensively
communicate with any family member, 3)
dismiss his pending civil suit against persons
holding an ownership interest in the ranch
property, .and 4) relinquish any interest in the
property.
On February 16, 1989, Gentry's counsel
withdrew. Gentry retained new counsel and on

R^

^
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February 24, 1989, filed a notice of appeal of
the trial courfs decision. On April 6, 19SV,
Gentry, filed a motion and supporting memorandum to withdraw his guilty plea and to
remand for a preliminary hearing. This court
stayed the appeal for sixty days or until the
trial court ruled on Gentry's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. On August 28, 1989,
Gentry filed a motion for a new trial and a
motion to disqualify Judge Eves, with supporting memorandum, affidavit of Gentry, and
certificate of counsel. On September 1, 1989,
Judge Eves denied Gentry's motion to withdraw the plea, but did not rule on Gentry's
other two motions.
On appeal, Gentry argues that the trial
court erred by 1) denying Gentry's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea; 2) failing to dispose
of his motion to disqualify the trial judge; and
3) failing to dispose of his motion for a new
trial. Gentry also claims he was denied effective assistance of counsel.1
WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEA
Gentry claims the trial court abused its
discretion in denying his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea. Specifically, Gentry argues that
the trial court failed to explain to Gentry the
elements and facts of the crime of theft before
he pled guilty, and that the trial court further
erred by relying on an incomplete record as a
substitute for Rule 11 compliance, in determining that Gentry entered his plea with full
knowledge and understanding of its consequences. Gentry also asserts that his hearing
impairment precluded him from being able to
fully understand the factual elements of the
charges during the course of the trial.
Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6 (1990) states,
in pertinent part, that "[a] plea of guilty ...
may be withdrawn only upon good cause
shown and with leave of court." We will
reverse the denial of a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea only when it clearly appears the
trial court has abused its discretion by failing
to find good cause. Srare v. Mildenhall, 141
P.2d 422, 424 (Utah 1987); State v. Vasilacopulost 756 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Rule 11(5)2 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides, in pertinent part:
The court may refuse to accept a
plea of guilty or no contest, and
may not accept the plea until the
court has found:
(d) the defendant understands the
nature and elements of the offense
to which he is entering the plea;
that upon trial the prosecution
would have the burden of proving
each of those elements beyond a
reasonable doubt; and that the plea
is an admission of all those elements....

UTAH ADVANCE REPORTS

ZZ

141 Utah M

Utah R. Crim. P. 11(5).
In cases considered prior to 1987, the Utah
Supreme Court held that the record as a whole
may affirmatively establish that defendant
entered his or her guilty plea with full knowledge and understanding of its consequences
and of the rights waived. Srare v. Miller, 718
P.2d 403, 405 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); Warner
v. Morris,
709 P.2d 309, 310 (Utah
1985); Brooks v. Morris, 709 P.2d 310, 311
(Utah 1985) (per curiam).
In State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah
1987), however, the supreme court modified
its prior decisions and held that the trial court
has the burden of ensuring that Rule 11(5) |
requirements are complied with when a guilty
plea is entered. Id. at 1312-13. The supreme
court stated that "to make a knowing guilty
plea, the defendants must understand the elements of the crimes charged and the relationship of the law to the facts." Id. at 1312. Gibbons noted that a sufficient affidavit may
be a starting point in determining whether a
defendant has an adequate understanding;
however, the court "should then review the
statements in the affidavit with the defendant,
question the defendant concerning his understanding of it, and fulfill the other requirements imposed by §77-35-11 on the record
before accepting the guilty plea." Id. at 1314.
If a court does not use an affidavit, the requirements in Gibbons and in Rule 11(5) must
likewise be met and be on the record. Id.
This court has interpreted Gibbons as effectively replacing the "record as a whole" test
with a strict Rule 11(5) compliance test in
accepting a defendant's guilty plea. Srare v.
Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) (per curiam); Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d at
94.3 The supreme court also has regarded Gibbons as a new rule of criminal procedure,
constituting a clear break with the past. Stare
v. Hickman, 779 P.2d 670, 672 n.l (Utah
1989) (per curiam). Consequently, both Utah
appellate courts have refused to apply the Gibbons strict compliance test to pre-Gibbons guilty
p l e a s . S e e , e.g.,
Hickman,
779
P.2d at 672 n.l; Vasilacopulos, 756 P.2d at
94.
The State claims, however, that the "record
as a whole" test remains viable even after Gibbons. The State contends that a close
reading of Gibbons reveals that the supreme
court was simply pointing out the preferred
and safest method of determining the voluntariness of a plea. The State reasons that since
the supreme court was able to review the transcript and determine that the examination of
Gibbons was inadequate, it would have remanded the case with an order that the plea be
withdrawn rather than lemanding for a
hearing on the issue of voluntariness if it intended to impose a rule'of strict Rule 11 compliance. The State also relies on J olivet v.

Cook, 784 P.2d 1148 (Utah 1989) and Srare v.
Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988) to
demonstrate that the supreme court, even after
Gibbons, relies on the "record as a whole"
test.
We cannot agree. First, the State misconstrues Gibbons. Gibbons does not simply state a
preferred method for determining the voluntariness of a plea, but clearly mandates that the
trial court must conduct an on-the-record
review with defendant of the Rule 11(5) requirements. Gibbons, 740 P.2d at 1313-34.
Also, the supreme court did not remand Gibbons for a hearing on the issue of voluntariness, but for the purpose of allowing defendant to move to withdraw his guilty plea
because he had not previously filed such
motion. Id. at 1311. Finally, it appears that
the court applied the "record as a whole" test
in Jolivet and Copeland because the guilty
pleas in both cases were entered before the Gibbons decision: Jolivet entered his plea in
1984, see Srare v. Jolivet, 712 P.2d 843, 84344 (Utah 1986) (date of plea revealed in
Jolivet's first appeal), and Copeland entered
his plea in 1986. Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1267.
In this case the record clearly shows that the
trial judge failed to comply with Gibbons and
Rule 11(5). The trial judge did not conduct an
on-the-record inquiry concerning Gentry's
understanding of the nature and elements of
the offense as required by Rule ll(5)(d). The
trial court simply determined that because
Gentry was present at trial, he was aware of
the evidence which had been admitted and the
charges against him. However, his understanding of the elements of the crime charged
and how those elements relate to the evidence
presented may not be presumed from his mere
presence during trial. See Valencia, 776 P.2d
at 1335. We further find it particularly necessary to require strict Rule 11 compliance in
this instance, where Gentry contends his
hearing disability prevented him from understanding everything that went on during the
I trial as well as during the proceedings regarI ding his guilty plea.
Rule 11(5) and Gibbons require the vacating
of Gentry's guilty plea on the ground that it
was not knowingly and voluntarily made. See
State v. Smith, 111 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah 1989).
Thus, we reverse and remand to allow Gentry
to withdraw his guilty plea and to proceed to a
new trial on the original charges. 4 In light of
our decision, we do not reach Gentry's other
claims.
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
WE CONCUR:
Judith M. Billings, Judge
Regnal W. Garff, Judge
1. The State argues that this appeal is moot since
Gentry will complete his eighteen month probation
before this court's opinion issues. We do not agree
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because the conditions of Gentry's probation, including his promise to abandon both his pending civil
action and any interest in ihe ranch, will continue
despite completion of probation.
2. In 1989, the subsection in former Rule 11(e) was
redesignated as Rule 11(5). See 1989 Utah Laws, ch.
65, §2.
3. In State v. Thurston, 781 P.2d 1296, 1301 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989), this court used "the record as a
whole" language in the opinion, but the issue argued
by appellant was that he did not voluntarily plead
guilty, because he mistakenly relied on the state's
assurance that it would recommend probation rather
than incarceration. Neither the state nor appellant
addressed the issue of whether Gibbons had resulted
in the demise of the "record as a whole" test. Therefore, we do not read Thurston as supporting the
state's position in this case.
4. Usually, when a guilty plea is rescinded the
parties are to be placed in the position each had
before the contract was entered into. People v.
Superior Court, 131 Cal. App. 3d 256, 258, 182 Cal.
Rptr. 426, 428 (1982); see also Wilson v. State, 698
S.W.2d 145, 146 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (en banc)
(rejects prior case law dictum that permitting a
withdrawal of a guilty plea was, in effect, the granting of a new trial). This case, however, presents
an unusual factual setting. Although the parties
represented to the trial court that all the evidence
had been presented prior to the change of plea, it is
not clear how Gentry would have proceeded had the
guilty plea not been entered. Further, Judge Eves
stated in his decision that the court was prepared to
determine that Gentry was proven guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt at the time of trial of both
charges, even if Gentry had not pled guilty. Since
neither counsel had presented closing arguments and
since it is possible that absent the guilty plea Gentry
would have produced further evidence, we find the
trial court's declaration of a guilty verdict at the
time of the plea nonbinding on remand. Consequently, we find that a new trial is essential to ensure
that Gentry has a fair hearing on the charges.
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